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Physician-Assisted Suicide (PAS)/Physician-
Assisted Death (PAD): the Rise of Lifeboat Ethics
Jeffrey Hall Dobken, M.D., M.P.H.
The Economic Rationale for Death Panels
In discussions of the need to “bend down the cost curve,” 
save resources, and thus achieve the goals of affordable and 
accessible care, there is the explicit or implicit question: Does 
our society need to eliminate the hopelessly ill?
Progressives and socialists have created existing law and 
templates to do this, and the concept is becoming popular 
with Americans. According to recent polls, those favoring 
assisted suicide now clearly outnumber those who oppose 
it: a Gallup poll endorsing “strong support” for euthanasia 
from May 2018 revealed 72 percent of Americans favor PAS.1 
Have the models of physician-assisted suicide (PAS or, 
now, physician-assisted death, PAD) in California, Colorado, 
Oregon, Vermont, Hawaii, Montana, Washington State, the 
District of Columbia, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Germany, 
and Canada provided evidence that these interventions 
have reduced costs and redistributed resources in a 
beneficial way? Canadians assert that “providing medical 
assistance in dying in Canada should not result in any excess 
financial burden to the healthcare system, and could result 
in substantial savings.”2 However, the cost savings have not 
been realized in any of these models for a variety of reasons,3 
and benefits have been illusory.
The Ethical Rationalization
How did the ethical quicksand of PAS/PAD come to be 
public policy and law? This happened because bioethicists 
have rationalized its philosophical basis in ethics.
The bioethics enterprise claims ownership and authorship 
of a hierarchy of moral thinking designed to protect society’s 
interests and the victims of injustice, be they children, the 
impoverished (and therefore uninsured), the voiceless, 
the injured, the diseased and dying, or minorities of any 
stripe, color, or gender. In debates, they—as the certified 
“ethicists”—characterize any opposing opinion or concept 
as “unethical.” 
In the mid-1990s, Peter Ubel wrote that “setting health 
care priorities is a value-laden enterprise, requiring us to 
make difficult decisions about what is most important in 
health care. Should we spend more money on prenatal 
care or on treating AIDS patients? Should we emphasize 
prevention or cure? Nevertheless, it is becoming increasingly 
necessary to set health care priorities. Health care costs have 
risen dramatically in recent decades, making it impossible 
to provide every potentially beneficial health care service to 
everyone who may benefit from it.”4
Ubel was referencing a bioethics debate that had begun 
in the 1960s in which the technical advance of hemodialysis 
promised a means to address end-stage kidney disease using 
the then-recently developed but numerically inadequate 
and/or unavailable new hemodialysis machines (“artificial 
kidneys.”) Their limited availability led to the creation of 
patient selection committees.5 The issues that arose were 
complex at many levels, but scarcity of resources was initially 
at the core. 
In today’s bioethics issues, scarcity of medical resources 
continues as the primary theme evoked, whether one 
considers transplantable organs, intensive-care beds, 
robotic surgical skills or apparatus, availability of trained 
medical professionals, etc. “Intransigent medical scarcity,” as 
described by Tom Koch,6 has become the accepted unsavory 
exigency that remains uncorrected, and for which ethical 
solutions must be found. 
For the bioethics enterprise, simply, there are too many 
people (patients) and not enough resources. Ironically, 
bioethicists do not directly address the reasons for this 
state of affairs or the means to correct it: the social, political, 
regulatory, and financial planning that created scarcity. 
Rather, for bioethicists, the opportunity to act as triage 
agents is by far a more desirable, enabling, and convenient 
role, and thus they obfuscate and avoid the underlying 
ethical issues. 
If scarcity is inevitable, then rationing is required, “if 
some are to be saved.” Bioethicists have developed complex 
metrics, analyses, and budgeting programs to determine, in 
an “ethical manner,” how decision-makers “must set priorities 
among competing opportunities.”7 The bioethical selection 
process for allocating scarce resources designates those 
patients who may best profit from them, and de-selects 
those who cannot profit, or simply cannot be saved. 
The Lifeboat Metaphor
A favorite bioethics technique is aptly described by 
Koch: “Bioethicists are very fond of lifeboat ethics and its 
assumption that some must be sacrificed that others may 
survive because there is not enough for all.”6 The bioethics 
model also includes a host of societal goals such as “bending 
down the cost curve” for expensive medical procedures, 
supervising the medical profession to eliminate “fraud and 
abuse,”8 etc. Social and economic values displace ethics 
goals.
Koch describes the genesis of the lifeboat metaphor in 
his book Thieves of Virtue:
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By 1991 the argument from scarcity had become a 
generally accepted bioethical and social truth referred 
to by the metaphor of “lifeboat ethics.” In 1991, for 
example, Boston University’s dean of medicine, Dr. 
Louis Lasagna, analogized the intransigent limits of 
health resources with those of the original overloaded 
lifeboat made famous in legal and social history in 
the landmark case United States v. Holmes…. Half the 
passengers drowned when the William Brown struck 
an iceberg in 1841; half were saved aboard its single 
longboat. Overloaded, the longboat was in danger 
of capsizing. As a result, the crew threw sixteen 
passengers overboard in a desperate attempt to 
assure the survival of at least a few of the remaining 
passengers….
“The medical system in the United States today 
[in 1991] finds itself in an analogous predicament…,” 
Lasagna wrote. “The cost of care has soared at roughly 
twice that of general inflation, partly because of the 
proliferation of expensive procedures—hemodialysis, 
organ and bone marrow transplants—that can quickly 
bankrupt a family.”
…In modernity’s lifeboat the ethical question is 
assumed reflexively to be not how to save everyone, 
but how best to choose among the equally needy, 
some of whom must die if any are to survive.6
The fixed notion of scarcity, along with bioethicists’ 
endorsement of the idea that the lifeboat metaphor 
represents medical reality, has led to repeated, virtually 
endless bioethics discussions on the treatment (or non-
treatment) of patients with limited prognoses as a “necessity” 
argument to amplify the need to ration. Examples routinely 
evoked describe end-stage medical scenarios, such as the 
ventilator-dependent Alzheimer’s patient with metastatic 
small cell lung carcinoma, or the severely mentally disabled 
child with acute lymphatic leukemia, or the multiply impaired 
adolescent with status post opiate overdose left in a chronic 
vegetative state, for whom any therapy can be construed as 
“wasted,” or as is preferred, “futile.”
Hippocratic Principle Pre-empted
Selected examples of human tragedy supply an endless 
data stream for the bioethicist as points of discussion that 
support the need to ration: futile therapy at end of life is 
expensive and, arguably, ineffective. Bioethicists fail to address 
the principle routinely honored by the Hippocratic physician: 
“Into whatever homes I go, I will enter them for the benefit 
of the sick.”9 The ethics of setting institutionalized health care 
policy or even state law based on economics alone has been 
rendered acceptable in the bioethics paradigm.10
It therefore becomes easy to understand the repetitively 
renewed focus on end-of-life (EOL) issues, PAS, brain-death 
criteria, and medically futile care. Indeed, my reviews and 
records of the agendas of the Biomedical Ethics Committee 
of Medical Society of New Jersey (MSNJ) meetings since 1988 
shows that a majority of MSNJ discussions were (and continue 
to be) devoted to some aspect of these topics.
The immediate past chairman of bioethics for the MSNJ, 
an affiliate of the AMA, e-mailed the following on Jul 30, 2018:
Hello everyone.  
I had very few replies about interest in being on a 
subcommittee to address: (1) The “futility” paper from 
the medical society—attached. (2) The Brain Death 
issue—amending with focus on specifics surrounding 
the religious exemption. (3) Moving forward the issue 
of PAS. (Physician Assisted Suicide).
Chairman McGeehan then re-emphasized his support 
and focus on PAS with an attached reference to Robert 
Klitzman’s coverage for CNN of a California lawsuit about 
a “right to die.”11 In Klitzman’s article, the current bioethics 
community’s “more acceptable” description of PAS as PAD 
(Physician Assisted Death) would somehow defuse the 
negative connotation that suicide “ends a life” as opposed to 
“enabling death to occur,” and allow for greater professional 
support and ethical acceptability.
Futility
The bioethics community has struggled with a “modern” 
definition for the concept of “futility in medical care” since 
the 1960s, the accepted birthdate of the neo-discipline. For 
many centuries and in many cultures a definition of “futility 
in care” has existed, but it is frequently contrasted with a 
more “modern” idiom created in the last several decades 
as technologies provided life-sustaining and lifesaving 
therapies. 
“Futility” as a “post-modern” concept is the mantra 
used to address rationing of scarce medical resources that 
are actually effective in maintaining life. Somehow, using 
medical resources to maintain or to sustain a life that 
would otherwise be beyond salvage is almost universally 
considered socioculturally and bioethically unacceptable. As 
Leon Kass stated:
The welcome triumphs against disease have 
been purchased at a price of dehumanization of the 
end of life: to put it starkly, once we lick cancer and 
stroke, we can all live long enough to get Alzheimer’s 
disease. And if the insurance holds out, we can die in 
the ICU suitably intubated. Fear of the very power we 
engaged to do battle against death and disease now 
leads us to demand that it give us poison.12
As the 19th century ended and the 20th began, the 
legacy definition of futility implied an untreatable condition 
unresponsive to any form of therapy, and formed the basis 
for programs of coercive sterilizations applied mostly to the 
underclasses of American society. Sterilization in the form of 
vasectomy, together with rising interest in eugenics, led in the 
1920s to the enactment of laws in 25 states for compulsory 
sterilization of the criminally insane and others considered 
untreatable inferiors (epilepsy, infant deformities, mental 
retardation, blindness, deafness, dwarfism, etc.). Policies 
and legislation were advanced as goals benefiting future 
generations, the collective betterment, and protection of 
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society through eugenics. 
The current definition officially promulgated by the MSNJ 
is that “(f )utile medical therapy can be considered to be any 
treatment that cannot within reasonable likelihood cure, 
palliate, ameliorate, or restore a quality of life that would be 
satisfactory to the patient. This includes any treatment in 
which the burdens greatly outweigh any chances of success 
or benefit to the patient.”13
Legal Precedents
Karen Ann Quinlan, Joseph Saikewicz, Shirley Dinnerstein, 
Nancy Cruzan, Helga Wanglie, Terri Schiavo, Jahi McMath, 
Alfie Evans, and Charlie Gard were patients whose cases 
reached the courts for resolution of non-treatment and end-
of-life issues. Legal remedies may address an individual set 
of circumstances, but they do not and cannot resolve these 
complex and increasingly numerous issues for society, or 
else the debate would simply be over. 
That the legal process is both limited and flawed is 
illustrated by the Buck v. Bell decision of May 2, 1927, when 
the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the Virginia statute that 
provided for eugenic sterilization of people considered 
genetically unfit. The Court’s decision, delivered by Justice 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., included the infamous phrase, 
“Three generations of idiots are enough.” Upholding 
Virginia’s sterilization statute provided the green light for 
similar laws in 30 states, under which an estimated 65,000 
Americans were sterilized without their consent or that of a 
family member.14
Society vs. the Individual
The focus on scarcity crystallized for the bioethics 
community under the aegis of several influential bioethicists, 
especially Daniel Callahan, the founder and president of the 
most prestigious bioethics think tank in the United States, 
the Hastings Center.6 Callahan stated in his 1987 publication 
Setting Limits: Medical Goals in an Aging Society that medical 
decision-making could only be considered a private matter 
between patients and physicians if the social cost was 
minimal, and that medicine’s obligation to sustain the fragile 
was limited. Keeping people alive through technology at 
a high cost threatened future generations.15 In July 2009, 
shortly before the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act became law, Peter Singer, a professor of bioethics at 
Princeton University, published an article in the New York 
Times Sunday Magazine, “Why We Must Ration Health Care.”16 
His commentary was predictable:
Rationing health care means getting value for the 
billions we are spending by setting limits on which 
treatments should be paid for from the public purse. 
If we ration, we won’t be writing blank checks to 
pharmaceutical companies for their patented drugs, 
nor paying for whatever procedures doctors choose 
to recommend. When public funds subsidize health 
care or provide it directly, it is crazy not to try to get 
value for money. The debate over health care reform 
in the United States should start from the premise 
that some form of health care rationing is both 
inescapable and desirable.16 
While the bioethics community and its coterie of moral 
philosophers continue to insist that intransigent scarcity 
is the natural state of medical affairs and represents the 
justification for supporting lifeboat ethics, the reality is that 
any ethical argument based on scarcity serves primarily as 
an excuse for the failure to provide necessary priorities and 
resources. Scarcity, as argued by the bioethics enterprise, 
is used as a device to advance a progressive agenda, to 
enhance the relevance of the bioethics community as moral 
guardians of the public welfare, and to redistribute goods 
and services for economic and political purposes.17 The 
lifeboat concept supports notions of health care reform as 
a centralized, planned process, supervised by philosopher-
ethicists.
In the presence of medical need affecting an entire 
population, distribution of the means to address such a 
crisis, such as a vaccine program, or acute respiratory care, 
or decontamination, cannot be judged or determined by 
a medically untrained bioethics community that primarily 
scales the distribution of medical care based on relative 
social worth, age, prognosis, or other social, non-medical 
determinants. That is a grievous ethical failure. While scarcity 
of resources can and will occur, at least at the onset of an 
acute critical medical problem, such as limited numbers 
of hemodialysis units available when they were initially 
approved, the ethically proper focus must be on the causes 
of a disease and how to address them, not on how to limit 
distribution of medical services based on considerations 
of “futility,” societal cost-effectiveness, or protection of 
theoretical future population needs.
From its inception, bioethics has treated resource scarcity 
as a natural inevitability rather than the result of prior 
choices. As Koch asserts, this “failure of vision has defined 
the bioethical role.” The bioethicist needs the lifeboat to 
consolidate the role of who is to be jettisoned, and who is 
worthy of saving, based on criteria of non-care that can be 
“ethically justified.” As professionals, “bioethicists have a 
stake in the problem, but not in its structural solution.”
Koch says it best: “[W]hat is the good of an ethics that 
never asks what we ought to do to prevent disaster and sees 
as entire the pragmatics of triage in disastrous but avoidable 
situations? Why embrace an ethic that stops where the real 
work would presumably begin?”6 
According to Albert Jonsen, a doyen of the bioethics 
enterprise, the principal emphasis of bioethics is a gatekeeper 
duty that focuses on community resources and distribution of 
sparse resources through the prism of a social justice ideology.18 
The worth of the individual, the humanity that the Oath of 
Hippocrates recognized and cherished, was to be replaced by 
neoliberalism’s progressive post-modernism: based upon the 
assumption of scarcity and its intractable limitations, triage 
and rationing must become part of our existence. Bioethicists, 
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despite their repeated advocacy of personal choice and 
autonomy as primary bioethical principles, deny the primacy 
of personal choice on the basis of the state’s future economic 
needs. The elderly, the frail, the multiply impaired, or the injured 
are a burdensome expense that can be abandoned to benefit 
the young and the worthy, i.e. those capable of providing a 
measurable benefit to the state.
When replacing advocacy for the frail, the sick, and/
or the dying, on the assumption that they are somehow 
undeserving of treatment based on cost accountancy, with 
what is generally called “assistance in dying” rather than 
the abandonment that it is, the bioethics enterprise has 
clearly violated every tenet for which it supposedly stood or 
was created: “moral thinking designed to protect society’s 
interests and the victims of injustice.”18 
The “Right to Die”
Rights arguments, like use of metaphors, are another 
favored device of the bioethics enterprise. The invention of 
a “right to die,” especially as it comes to embrace a right to 
“aid-in-dying,” must translate into a legislated obligation on 
the part of others (namely physicians) to kill or help kill. Apart 
from the moral and coercive personal offense that such a 
duty requires, it is difficult to imagine and configure a limited 
statute permitting homicide by a privileged few and exercised 
in the name of society. The abuses in Netherlands testify to the 
effects of this moral breach.19
There is simply no way to confine the practice to those 
knowingly and freely requesting death. The clear majority 
of candidates for assisted death are, and increasingly will be, 
incapable of choosing and effecting such a course of action 
for themselves. No one with an expensive or troublesome 
infirmity will be safe from the pressure to have his “right to 
die” exercised. The medical profession’s devotion to healing, 
to doing no harm—its ethical center—has been sullied 
and irreparably damaged, and its trustworthiness ethically 
compromised by this bioethically designed breach. Was this 
the goal of the bioethics enterprise: to make the medical 
professional untrustworthy? Lack of trust in the profession 
of medicine has certainly been central to the process of 
progressive “healthcare reform.” 
There is no recognizable “right to die,” and there is no 
duty to die. Modern medicine can design better methods 
of caring for the dying, without complicated governmental 
intervention. The need for access to adequate hospice care—
to comfort care—without the need for political posturing, a 
rights argument, a faux ethic, and a legislative and regulatory 
mandate based on economic falsehoods, cannot be addressed 
without the expertise of the medical community.
Conclusions
There is no need to assert a right to die or to create a 
lifeboat ethic, no need to triage and jettison the “unworthy” as 
selected by non-medically trained third parties who bear no 
direct relationship to the patient. Bioethicists play such a role 
yet deny responsibility for the outcome for their interventionist 
advisory function. In rejecting traditional Hippocratic ethics on 
socio-cultural-economic grounds, bioethics has abandoned 
the fundamental medical ethical commitment to the person 
in need. The state has become the patient.
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